The Second World War Utility furniture scheme represented a distinctive moment in the changing geographies of the twentieth-century British furniture industry. The scheme enabled the British state to direct the entire furniture commodity chain, from the regulation of timber supplies through to the management of final consumption. Whilst there has been some discussion of Utility within the context of modernism in design, the paper explores the broader historical geographies of Utility furniture. We demonstrate the ways in which state activity in wartime reconfigured socio-economic networks of production, distribution and consumption. The paper's assessment of the Utility scheme reveals the importance of historical contingency in commodity chain dynamics as well as the role of the national state as a key organising agent.
The Second World War Utility furniture scheme represented a distinctive moment in the changing geographies of the twentiethcentury British furniture industry. Planned through the latter part of 1942 and implemented in 1943, the scheme enabled the state to direct the entire furniture commodity chain, from the regulation of timber supplies to the management of final consumption. The wartime office of the Board of Trade specified a small set of designs for manufacture, designated individual firms for the production of Utility furniture, and controlled distribution through the issue of buying permits to households. When the scheme began, allocations of 'units' were provided to newly married couples setting up their first home and to existing households who had lost furniture as a result of bombing, whilst later in the war the families of pregnant women and/or with growing children also were prioritised. 1 The Utility furniture scheme continued in a strict sense until 1948, with a modified 'Freedom of design' phase lasting until the end of price control and quality assurance in 1952.
2 Whilst the Utility period may appear to be a relatively short episode, it was shaped by concerns about the furniture industry which stretched back to the late nineteenth century, including disquiet with poor working conditions in sweated parts of the trade. 3 The reorganisation of the industry under the Utility scheme also was bound up with debates about the value of 'good design' and a need for design reform, which continued to frame assessments of the British furniture industry through the 1950s and 1960s. In part, the Utility scheme sought to address contemporary critiques such as Pevsner's which decried parts of the furniture trade for lacking design skill and reproached retailers for offering 'cheap goods' to the public. 4 When the scheme was introduced by the Board of Trade in 1942, a press announcement implied a need for design reform: 'the function of the [Advisory] Committee [on Utility Furniture] will be to produce specifications for furniture of good, sound construction in simple but agreeable designs for sale at reasonable prices, and ensuring the maximum economy of raw materials and labour.'
5
Design historical approaches have situated the emergence of Utility design in relation to both modernism and the Arts and Crafts movement, as well as tracing connections between the Utility scheme and state-sponsored efforts to encourage 'good design' such as the establishment of the Design and Industries Association, the Council for Art and Industry and the Council of Industrial Design. 6 Some accounts have read the aims and intentions of the Utility furniture scheme as a means of attempting to shift British attitudesdof the industry itself as well as the wider publicdaway from 'traditional' and towards 'modern' designs. 7 In this paper we situate the scheme within the context of a broader system of wartime controls at a time of deep crisis. Faced with constraints at all points in the furniture commodity chain, the British state became involved in a wholesale reimagining of the geographies of furniture production, distribution and consumption. Early in the Second World War, the state was compelled to engage with acute shortages of finished consumer goods as well as the primary raw materials of timber, plywood and veneers. 8 Retailing and distribution of furniture also required control and intervention, given that the transport of bulky goods over long distances placed demands on scarce petrol resources. Finallydand not least importantdleading furniture manufacturing firms were drawn into war work, leaving limited plant and labour capacity in remaining small and medium sized firms. Domestic furniture production was restructured via the 'designation' of individual firms in particular cities and regions to produce different types of Utility furniture (i.e. chairs, sideboards, wardrobes etc.) in order to distribute manufacturing capacity more evenly across the whole of Britain.
9
Careful specification of a narrow range of designs sought to ensure that manufacturers achieved economy of materials and were able to provide a uniform quality of product to consumers at fixed prices. As a 1942 Board of Trade memorandum written shortly before the introduction of the Utility scheme stated, 'price control of new furniture cannot achieve maximum effectiveness until there is complete control of all stages of production from the raw material to the finished article.' 10 The central aim of this paper is to elaborate and interpret changing geographies of the British furniture industry during the wartime Utility period. 11 The paper makes two important contributions. First, we develop the Utility case as a means of foregrounding the role of the state in reconfiguring commodity chains, and underscoring 'the implications of this insight for appreciating the historically contingent and politically constructed nature of chains.'
12
The vast majority of research on late twentieth-century commodity chains and networks has emphasised the coordination of chains by lead firms (or transnational corporation networks). 13 However, the example of Utility furniture offers the possibility of excavating the role played by the national state not merely as an institutional backdrop to the making and remaking of commodity chains but rather as an important 'organising agent.' 14 The paper seeks to develop new perspectives on geographies of commodity chains and the role of the state: that is, not only do states regulate commodities as they cross territorial boundaries, but alsodas explored heredthey may act to reconstitute commodity chain dynamics at different scales. Insofar as an investigation of Utility furniture during the Second World War illuminates a distinct power shift away from manufacturers and retailers and towards the national state, our account lends weight to Bair's argument that 'historical analysis. helps to avoid the temptation of seeing the organisation of contemporary commodity chains as necessary or inevitable..'
15
Second, the case of Utility furniture provides a valuable window onto commodity chain dynamics at a time of crisis, sharply contrasting with contemporary global commodity chain analyses which emphasise 'the durability, expansion and institutionality of global markets.' 16 Further, the paper's focus on a distinctive type of crisisdthat is, wartimeddemonstrates the ways in which military activity reconfigures socio-economic networks of production, distribution and consumption. As Evenden has observed in the case of the aluminium commodity chain, wartime restructuring redrew the boundaries of industrial geography and geopolitics; mobilised distant peoples and places and environments; and imposed a legacy on postwar production and consumption patterns.
17
Additionally, however, our discussion amplifies arguments about the ways in which war reshapes activities within and across nodes in the commodity chain with a notable focus on a product destined for domestic rather than military consumption: furniture. The remainder of the paper traces the geographies of Utility furniture through consideration of transformations in timber supply; coordination of design; reshaping of manufacturing geographies; and shifts in the retailing and consumption of furniture, documenting the 'extensive' and 'intricate' control retained by the British state through the Board of Trade. 18 Whilst coordination and control of the wartime food and clothing industries were perhaps strongest at points of consumption (particularly, of course, via rationing), the furniture industry was distinctive in the reconfiguration of practices and processes across the commodity chain. The Control was originally set up in conditions of extreme physical scarcity and great risks in transit; many of the peacetime sources of supply were closed, and it was inevitable that the acquisition of all the available timber should be carried out by a body supported by the full financial power of the State and able to bear heavy trading losses.
41
Although the appropriate level of Timber Control's profits was debated in the post-war period, both during and immediately following the war it operated at a loss.
42
Given that it was such a large consumer of imported materials, the furniture industry was 'quick to feel the impact of war.'
43 Timber
Control announced in July 1940 that no timber was to be available to domestic furniture manufacturers. Quota schemes subsequently were implemented across a range of different industries, and specific arrangements for furniture were applied in November 1941. After this date, only firms registered with the Timber Supplies Committee (part of Timber Control) could receive supplies of wood. What had been an already limited quota was cut in January 1942, and furniture manufacturers' pre-war timber stocks became significantly depleted. Both Timber Control and the Board of Trade increasingly became concerned about the price, quality and availability of domestic furniture available to consumers. Firms during this early wartime period were described as eking out their timber supplies with inferior material, or increasing their profits by the application of unnecessary decoration, and the result was a supply of expensive and poor quality furniture insufficient to meet the general demand.
44
Later post-war commentators Hargreaves and Gowing similarly noted that '.the shortage of timber had led to the extensive use of poor substitute materials; this encouraged the production of furniture whose shoddiness was often disguised by decoration.' 45 Although new furniture initially was subject to both price control and maximum timber content, pressures on manufacturers resulted in the production of 'poor quality articles,' and secondhand furniture remained outside price control altogether. 46 In many ways, then, the impetus for state control via the Utility furniture scheme can be seen to have emerged as a result of raw materials shortages. Pressures on the home furnishings commodity chain in the form of raised prices and poor quality were shaped at least in part by the scarcity of timber. As we have seen, initial measures by Timber Control sought to regulate and ration timber supply. Further controls then were introduced to limit the cost of second-hand furniture to its original selling price. 47 However, it became clear that neither price nor distribution control measures on their own would be sufficient to achieve the equitable distribution of adequate quality furniture to needy consumers, and in 1942 the Board of Trade moved a further step 'along' the commodity chain to specify designs for manufacture. The arrangements for furniture were distinctive: whilst Utility schemes were implemented for goods such as clothing, shoes and pottery, 'it was only the furniture industry that was compelled to conform to specific statutory designs.' 48 
Designing utility
If there is to be the utmost economy in the use of timber (and other materials) and labour then what in effect are standard designs will have to be evolved. This will follow from the specifications, because unless the latter are such that there is little scope for variation the economy of material will not be fully achieved. Both the manufacturers and the public will have to be educated away from the 'frills and fancies' of the present commercial products towards articles which through simple and even 'austere' in design are far more serviceable, practical, hard-wearing and pleasing to the eye. Here seems an opportunity which should not be missed for designers and craftsmen to co-operate through the exigencies of War to make a contribution towards the general betterment of furniture design and constructiondthere is ample evidence of the need for it at the present juncture when furniture is being 'thrown together' with the shoddiest of materials and workmanship, and sold at fantastically high prices. 49 On Through the introduction and development of the Utility furniture programme, the simplicity and clean lines of Utility design often were contrasted withdas described by O.H. Frost abovedthe 'frills and fancies' seen to be characteristic of the reproduction furniture that dominated the 'lower end' of the British furniture trade in the early twentieth century. Such a distinction recurs within government documents and commentaries by key individuals. A Board of Trade memorandum remarked that 'there is a chance here, during our period of greatest economy, of influencing popular taste towards good construction in simple, agreeable design to the benefit of our after-the-war homes' (see Figs. 1 and 2) . 56 Member of the Advisory Committee Gordon Russell described pre-war furniture as '[not] so much reproduction as machine-made caricature' and claimed that with the introduction of Utility furniture 'the basic rightness of contemporary design won the day, for there wasn't enough timber for bulbous legs or enough labour for even the cheapest carving and straightforward, Russell's and particularly Cutler's assessments might be seen to resonate with certain tenets of modern design, such as Le Corbusier's suggestion that manufacturers disguise faults through the addition of unnecessary ornamentation: 'Trash is always abundantly decorated; the luxury object is well made, neat and clean, pure and healthy, and its bareness reveals the quality of its manufacture.' 59 Given the extent to which a rhetoric of 'good design' in the sense of fitness for purpose and quality of materials ran through early twentieth-century discussions of the British furniture industry, it is not surprising that twenty-first century commentators have referred to the Utility furniture scheme as 'an unprecedented opportunity for design reformers to put their ideas into practice.' 60 For some design historians, Utility is considered to be 'an iconic period in the history of the "good design" movement' and even has been read as 'synonymous with modernism.'
61
Unpacking the extent to which Utility represented the explicit promotion of modern design, however, reveals a more complex story and in particular substantiates assessments which emphasise a variety of national modernisms. 62 Beyond interpretation of the design lineages of Utility, however, we would argue that it also is important to understand the ways in which design aesthetics were shaped by the requirements of wartime production. The Board of Trade believed that providing firms with detailed specifications for simple designs would enable state-designated firms to cope with both the technical aspects of manufacture and the production schedules necessary to meet wartime demand. Close dimensional specifications were stipulated in order to avoid wastage in the cutting of wood stock. As we shall see in the following section, the geographic redistribution of the industry under the Utility scheme shifted production to 'comparatively inexperienced manufacturers.' 65 As Gordon Russell recalled in the 1970s, a number of firms with good equipment had been called on to do more urgent Government work, so anyone with a reasonable number of wood-working machines was pressed into service. The specification had to be detailed and explicit. Some of these people had to be coached.
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Or in designer Edwin Clinch's interpretation:
You see, everybody had to make this furniture, from the little tin-pot factory employing six to ten people, to Harris Lebus employing thousands, and it all had to be done to this specification.
67
Standardisation and the centralisation of design expertise thus would assist in the coordination of production across all parts of Britain. Economies of scale in design could be achieved if individual firms did not have to engage in the design aspects of production: 'if utility types are fixed once and for all there must necessarily be a considerable labour saving on the work of designing.' 68 Finally, 'since uniformity of price and service had to be maintained, design and specification had to take account of the widely differing equipment of manufacturers. Design had in fact to be adapted to the simplest productive processes.' 69 Under the Utility scheme, then, the state operated much like a precursory Ikea, closely specifying designs with the intent of controlling costs and efficiency. All furniture was to be stamped with a Utility mark ('CC41,' colloquially known as 'the cheeses': see Fig. 3 ) and the designation number of the manufacturer. The mark functioned as a state guarantee of quality whilst the specific designation number enabled traceability of individual pieces of furniture.
Manufacturing geographies
Having approved a set of standard designs in autumn 1942, the Board of Trade then sought applications from firms wishing to manufacture Utility furniture. The Board calculated that 150 firms of 40 employees each operating at 'near-full capacity' would be required to satisfy target production levels of 400,000 units every four weeks. 70 An initial closing date of 28 October was extended to allow additional applications, and by 10 November 1942, 600 firms had responded. 71 Approximately 1150
firms had held a nominal timber quota in the early part of the war and the reduction in capacity under the Utility scheme was potentially very difficult for the Board of Trade. 72 Although larger firms such as Ercol and Harris Lebus shifted to the war work of aircraft production or assembling munitions cases, the manufacture of Utility furniture was attractive to remaining firms with available plant and labour. 73 Consultation with furniture trade associations was seen to be important given that designation involved 'cutting out such a large proportion of firms from a lucrative trade.'
74
Designation also involved the careful selection of firms based on a range of specific criteria. The Board of Trade sought manufacturers with just the right amount of capacity to produce efficiently the number of tables, chairs, wardrobes etc. needed in each region, and to pay regard at the same time to the demand for each firm's labour and premises for other purposes, as well as the question of price. 75 In order to achieve production efficiencies, firms designated to manufacture Utility furniture needed to have sufficient 'machining' as well as 'kilning capacity for drying home-grown timber' given that larger volumes of home-grown timber were drawn into production. 76 It also was stipulated that designated firms must 74 Binney, Progress of designation of firms to make utility furniture (note 71), BT 64/1816. 75 Binney, Progress of designation of firms to make utility furniture (note 71), BT 64/1816. 76 Hargreaves and Gowing, Civil Industry and Trade (note 8), 518. Whilst almost all pre-war imported timber was kiln-dried prior to shipping, home-grown British timber traditionally was left to air dry. Given the impossibility of building up timber stocks during the war, kilning facilities were essential to avoid warping and distortion of Utility furniture. The need for the furniture industry to continue to modernise this aspect of production is emphasised in Appendix E, The kilning of timber; in Board of Trade, Working Party Reports: Furniture, 177e178.
produce only Utility furniture, which excluded companies who were engaged in other types of government work. Petrol shortages and transport difficulties meant that regional geographies of furniture production and supply became an important consideration. Where possible, capacity was to be distributed across specified zones so that local firms could deliver to local consumers. In addition, careful calculations had to be made about local labour market geographies and the extent to which labour could be 'release [d] .in the right places.' 77 Firms were graded as scarlet, Designation represented a significant transformation of the geographies of the British furniture industry, which traditionally had been concentrated in High Wycombe and in the East End of London. High Wycombe's historic role as a centre of productiondespecially the manufacture of Windsor chairsdoften has been interpreted as a function of its proximity to beech wood in the Chilterns. 81 By the late nineteenth century, the industry increasingly had begun to use imported timber and firms developed production beyond chairs to include all types of cabinet goods. Although local timber sources became less important, local labour markets retained their significance. At one level it has been argued that 'the industry was held in the district by the skill of the local craftsmen.' 82 Further, however, production was supported by a dense network of outworking and subcontracting relationships, as evident from the report of an interwar subcommittee tasked with investigating 'profiteering':
[bedroom] suites are made by all classes of manufacturers, from the largest factories in the country to small backroom workshops. In a number of cases it was found that certain firms purchased their suites 'in the white' (i.e. made by small workshops and sold unfinished) then finished and polished the suites for resale. It has been ascertained that sometimes the firm supplies the timber to the small manufacturer, who makes the suite and returns it to the original firm who supplied the timber, thus simply being paid for his labour and profit. 83 Wages for men making daily journeys from the villages surrounding High Wycombe were higher than could be obtained in agriculture, but seasonal irregularity and underemployment during slack times in the furniture industry contributed to a fragile labour market position. 84 High Wycombe's importance continued through the inter-war period, but the furniture industry also saw significant expansion in London. 85 The East End tradedor what Peter Hall has termed the 'Victorian manufacturing belt'dshifted northwards into Tottenham, Edmonton and Walthamstow. 86 Inner London manufacturers came to serve a smaller-scale, higher quality market whilst in the outer boroughs large scale manufacturing premises (supported by new developments in electrification) began to supply the growing mass market in London and the South-East. 87 The regional concentrations of the industry in 1935 are evident in Table 2 , in which 43.3% of firms and almost half of total furniture employment was located in the Greater London region, which includes High Wycombe. 88 Production of Utility furniture began in January 1943, with 132 firms designated by March 1943. 89 The Utility Furniture Distribution Committee monitored production on a monthly basis, and designated additional firms where necessary and possible. By February 1944, 171 firms had been designated, as detailed in Fig. 4 , including notable clusters of activity along a LeedseManchestereLiverpool axis, in Birmingham, Bristol and in central Scotland. 90 This restructuring marked a substantial cut in the numbers employed in the furniture industry, from a pre-war figure of over 100,000 employees to 5872 by February 1944. It also involved some significant spatial shifts. As indicated above, the Distribution Committee in order to minimise transport costs sought, where possible, to spread manufacturing more evenly across the country. It established 38 'production zones,' such that firms would supply retailers within a local area. Zones mainly were based on existing county boundaries, with some amalgamations in, for example, Devon and Cornwall or Norfolk and Suffolk. As Fig. 4 illustrates, by February 1944 there were 55 designated firms in the Greater London and High Wycombe area. This amounted to 32.2% of total firms, a considerable de-concentration of production away from the industry's traditional heartland. Alongside this general pattern of dispersal, however, the new geography of furniture manufacturing ultimately came to be characterised by considerable regional differentiation. There were seventeen categories of Utility furniture, ranging from bulky items such as category 1 (Wardrobes, Chests and Tallboys) and category 3 (Sideboards and Dining Tables), to lighter and relatively more easily transportable items such as categories 4 (Dining Chairs) 7 (Kitchen Chairs) and nursery furniture, such as category 15 (Cots) and 17 (Playpens). Some items, notably dining and kitchen chairs, required more specialist knowledge and machinery to mass produce efficiently (or at least so argued successfully a number of High Wycombe's traditional chair manufacturers to the Distribution Committee). Ultimately, none of the designated firms produced all items in the Utility range. Firms varied considerably in what items they were designated to produce and the number of zones to which these products could be supplied. As the Chairman of the Utility Furniture Distribution Committee explained in December 1942:
The area a manufacturer will be permitted to supply will sometimes depend on his type of production; for example, Hutchinson and Edmonds of High Wycombe will be permitted to supply dining chairs to all England and Wales except Cumberland, Westmorland, Cheshire, Northumberland and Durham. 91 By 1944 Hutchinson and Edmonds, along with five additional High Wycombe manufacturers, were supplying kitchen chairs to all (and dining chairs to most of) the 38 production zones across England, Scotland and Wales, while most other High Wycombe firms were supplying at least 20 of the country's zones. Only two of the fifteen High Wycombe firms were making anything other than two of the chair categories in the Utility range, making High Wycombe in effect a specialised chair manufacturing area supplying regions across England, Scotland and Wales. In contrast, in some zones firms produced only one or a very few Utility items for localised distribution, whilst others produced a wider range of Utility products, sometimes for a restricted local geography, but sometimes a regional or national one.
We can get a further sense of this complexity by more closely examining the furniture production and supply geographies for Devon and Cornwall, one of the more peripheral zones (see Table 3 ). Of the twenty-six companies supplying Utility furniture to this zone, only four were actually located within it. The Seymour Cabinet Works of Plymouth and Dartington Hall Ltd. of Totnes produced only one and two (respectively) relatively bulky items of the Utility range, whilst the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) of Plymouth and Clatworthy and Co. Ltd. of South Brent supplied a much wider number of items from the Utility catalogue. None of these companies supplied outside Devon and Cornwall. Three Bristol companies (within the next closest production zone: Gloucester) met the remaining demand for relatively bulky furniture items, whilst all the Utility chair and nursery items were supplied (with one exception, the Ex-Service Industries Copex works in Warminster) from seventeen companies from London and the High Wycombe area. In summary, then, reorganisation of the industry did shift furniture production away from its 'heartland' in London and High Wycombe, particularly the manufacture of bulky items such as sideboards and wardrobes; however the specialist production of chairs was largely retained by High Wycombe firms. Whilst in part this specialisation can be attributed to the materiality of the chair itself, High Wycombe firms did exert a certain influence in the early period of designation. At 'special meetings,' representatives pressed very strongly for work equivalent to the employment of 300 people, emphasising that Wycombe was the home of the chair trade, that there were numbers of employees not adaptable for other work and that production at Wycombe was specially economical of timber owing to the sorts and cuts which Wycombe is skilled in using. On the other hand, we had to bear in mind the claims of other districts, for example, Scotland, where dining room chairs can be made and also the need to cut down transport to the minimum. 92 Apart from the role of the High Wycombe firms, however, the introduction of the Utility scheme meant a relative decline in influence of manufacturers. Across the national space of the furniture industry, there was scepticism and even overt hostility from the furniture trade, particularly in relation to a loss of design control. Considering themselves craftsmen, manufacturers resented what they saw as a deskilling of the trade. 93 This was despite the fact that some companies had considerable sales success with Utility-based designs for several decades after the end of the scheme. 94 Resentment also was felt by owners of firms excluded from Utility designation who, without labour or raw materials during wartime, did not survive into the post-war period. 95 Distribution, retailing and consumption: supplying utility
At the first meeting of the Utility Furniture Distribution Committee on 2 November 1942, it was agreed that the simplest way to work would be to follow the furniture through its progress from the manufacturer to the consumer, so that recommendations could be made for dealing with any obstacles which might hinder the machinery of distribution.
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Utility furniture was distributed to wartime consumers through a distinctive set of mechanisms which differed from goods such as clothing and food, for example. The scarcity of furniture and concerns about selling 'on the black market' 97 led to the development of a rigid system of pointing, under which a specific number of units were required for each piece of furniture. Allocations were made only to 'priority classes' of household. Households were required to apply to the nearest District Office of the Assistance Board, which issued buying permits on behalf of the Board of Trade. Both the maximum number of units as well as the definition of priority classes were revised as the war progressed: in 1942 priority households were entitled to a maximum of 60 units, and were defined as couples who proposed to marry and set up house within three weeks or who had married on or after 1st January 1941; people who were setting up house because they had or were about to have young children, and people who had lost furniture through enemy action. 98 Later in the war the definition was extended to include all who had set up house since September 1939 as well as married refugees. Throughout the war, maximum retail prices for individual pieces were fixed and all Utility furniture was exempt from purchase tax. Paralleling manufacturers' loss of control of design aspects of production, the role of retailers in the Utility furniture commodity chain also was considerably circumscribed. The spaces of furniture retailing (a wide mix of outlets including small independent shops, department stores and some national chains) did not change significantly during the wartime period, but retailer power diminished. State control was seen to offer efficiency and economy not only in design but also in the delivery of goods to the consumer. Early discussions of the Advisory Committee on Utility Furniture noted that we do not want to waste time designing and selling a lot of different types of furniture at the present stage of the war; if utility types are fixed once and for all there must necessarily be a considerable labour saving on the work of designing and of selling. 99 Retailers were no longer engaged in any form of advertising or marketing; and once the scheme was introduced, no longer held stocks. Such was the shortage of individual pieces of furniture in first months of the scheme that retailers were unable even to put goods on display. Consumers might have been able to visit a regional exhibition set up by the Board of Trade, but generally they were required to consult the Utility catalogue (either purchased from a bookshop or viewed at a retailer), choose selected items, and place an order. Retailers would submit the order to their designated suppliers.
It also was felt that the use of regional exhibitions would diffuse competition between retailers. The Utility Furniture Distribution Committee wanted to ensure that smaller retailers were not disadvantaged over others (such as department stores and larger multiples), for example because they lacked space to display larger sets of Utility furniture. The Distribution Committee also sought to reprimand retailers' use of any form of consumer enticement:
Mr Barber [of the Retail Distributors Association] brought up the case of Messrs. Brodericks who are offering to give a gift of £2 worth of National Savings Stamps to every customer buying £40 worth of utility furniture.
Concerns also were expressed about Utility furniture contributing to a Co-operative dividend and thereby potentially disadvantaging other retailers. 100 As we have indicated, one aim of the Utility furniture scheme was that manufacturers would produce 'locally' (or at least within designated zones), such that consumers within a given area could be supplied without waste of scarce and expensive petrol resources. Changing geographies of production thus were meant to lock closely together with geographies of consumption. In addition to the desire for equality of access to resources via national level rationing systems, it also has been suggested that the Utility scheme aimed to achieve an even spatial distribution of 'public access to furniture.' 101 Mr Barber was assured that the Committee would continue to monitor the situation. Balancing production and demand became a key role for the Board of Trade. When the scheme was first introduced, difficulties arose not only because manufacturers struggled to quickly achieve adequate production levels, but also because of a pent-up consumer demand for furniture. At times the state sought to resolve supply difficulties through more general measures such as introducing a six week restriction on new permit applications in July 1943. Upon resumption of supply, permits were only issued for the value of 30 units, which as Hargreaves and Gowing noted, was 'barely enough to furnish one room.' 104 Although a greater number of householders were able to obtain Utility furniture in the latter part of the war because of extensions to the definition of priority classes, a lack of supply meant that buying permits could not be increased to 60 units until March 1946. 105 Specific attention was paid to variations in demand for different types of furniture. Cross-comparison of information from permit application forms as well as manufacturing data at a national level enabled the Board of Trade to assess variations across furniture types: a May 1943 memorandum concluded, for example, that the items for which licensed production should be somewhat reduced are the divan, chair, kitchen table, kitchen cabinet and sets of shelves, whilst the figures for dining tables and sideboards should be increased. We do not recommend a reduction on bedsteads, as the demand for this item is likely to increase as the right of growing children to have one becomes known. 106 In hindsight the lack of demand for kitchen cabinets was not perhaps surprising given their relatively high 'pointing.' At the same time, the Distribution Committee had not considered that whilst householders might make do with temporary shelving arrangements in the kitchen, there was a greater desire for bedroom and dining room furniture.
Further, however, the Board of Trade sought to respond to the changing regional geography of furniture demand. In April 1943 it was recorded that there were 'considerable variations [in demand] from region to region. in Scotland, for instance, demand (i.e. units issued) was only 54% of the basic figure whilst in London it was 185%.' 107 The Distribution Committee concluded that the only possibility of responding to this unevenness would be to decrease access to the regional exhibitions of Utility furniture: 'it was REC-OMMENDED that although the real purpose of exhibitions was the dissemination of necessary information, they should initially be confined to areas where supply is adequate in relation to demand, Ironically, assumptions by design reformers about the pedagogic function of Utility designs for consumers have had a tendency to reinforce the notion that consumers were disapproving. That is, if consumers needed to be 'educated' about 'good design,' their prevailing preference must have been for 'bad' design. Designer Edwin Clinch recalled that:
as for the customers, it was the only thing to have, and they were used to something else. But that wasn't good furniture so we were re-educating them, definitely.
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By definition, then, consumers are positioned as rejecting something with which they were unfamiliardor untrained in appreciating. Not only does such commentary reveal class-prejudiced assumptions about a need for 're-education,' but also we would also argue that an exclusive emphasis upon design issues underplays the practical benefits of the Utility scheme for consumers. Despite associations with wartime deprivation, it might also have been that householdersdparticularly those setting up home for the first time under conditions of austeritydvalued the ability to obtain new household goods. For example, a Mass Observation diarist commented on the arrival of the furniture for which her mother had obtained permits: 'I think it is jolly good considering that it is Utilitydthe wardrobes are grand, large and roomy. ' 119 For consumers, the Utility furniture scheme offered the egalitarian distribution of a standardised product, connecting with principles of progressive political reform inherent in modernism more broadly.
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Conclusions
During the Second World War, geographies of the British furniture commodity chain were extensively reorganised and reshaped through the introduction of the Utility furniture scheme. Directed by the wartime state through the Board of Trade, the Utility scheme reworked raw material supply, design, manufacturing, distribution, retailing and consumption of furniture. This paper has investigated this specific example of state control in order to enrich discussion of the historically-specific role of actors across nodes throughout the commodity chain, rather than simply viewing states as providing the institutional contexts within which commodity chains operate. The Utility example also foregrounds chain dynamics under conditions of crisis, offering a critical counterpoint to accounts which emphasise 'continuity over space and stability over time.'
The Board of Trade and its associated committees stipulated detailed specifications as a means of managing material shortages and facilitating the allocation of production capacity to a wide range of firms. The coordination and monitoring of manufacturing across designated firms in specified zones resulted in a distinctive de-concentration of activity away from the historical centres of London and High Wycombe. This pattern of dispersal was cross-cut by regional differentiation, which emerged as the Board of Trade assessed firms' capacity to produce different categories of furniture while also attempting to regulate and control distribution and consumption.
Although the reconfiguration of the commodity chain was by no means uncontesteddmanufacturers were concerned about the loss of design capability and retailers argued that the designs would not selldthis paper queries interpretations which have foregrounded consumers' unfavourable opinions of Utility furniture. We have argued that there is scarce evidence for such a contention. We are wary of portrayals which position households as highly critical of Utility designs, as these assessments rest largely on readings of manufacturers' and retailers' conjectures about consumer responses rather than detailed historical work on consumption.
Ultimately, the attempt to ensure equitable distribution of a standardised product at controlled prices, combined with the aim of making efficient use of scarce resources at a time of great shortage can be seen to represent a progressive intervention, which offers on-going lessons for the social and environmental regulation of commodity chains.
122 Not only does the Utility example demonstrate the importancedat a time of sudden raw material shortagedof the need to reconfigure a range of sites across the commodity chain, but also we would argue that it reveals a key regulatory and coordinating role for the national state. The wartime period of Utility raises questions about the transformative power of market mechanisms to make change happen, particularly at times of instability. Given the potential for market responses to crisis conditions to have iniquitous social consequences such as inflation, profiteering and the racketeering of substandard substitute products, the case of Utility furniture opens up sharp questions about the most appropriate mechanisms for achieving environmentally sustainable, socially equitable and resource efficient futures.
